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I. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
a. The Nature of the Case 
Appellants Dr. Rex Rammell and Lynda Rammell, doing business as Elk Country Trophy 
Bulls, ("the Rammells" or "Dr. Rammell") are appealing to this Court the Memorandum 
Decision of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, the Honorable Brent J. Moss 
presiding, issued on November 9, 2007. That Memorandum Decision was rendered by the 
district cout in its appellate capacity and in review of the Rammells' Petition For Judicial 
Review of the Final Order of the Deputy Director of the Department of Agriculture (the "Final 
Order") entered on May 5, 2005, against the Rammells. That Final Order was a result of a 
contested case and administrative hearing brought by the Department of Agriculture (the 
"Department") against the Rammells under the IAPA and the IDAPA Rules of the Department. 
In the Department's Administrative Complaint, the Department asserted that the Rammells 
violated an Idaho statute and several Department regulations concerning the containment, 
management and reporting requirements for domestic cervidae (elk) ranchers. In defense, Dr. 
Rammell attempted to assert at the administrative hearing before hearing officer, Jean Uranga 
(the "Hearing Officer"), and on review before the Deputy Director, Mike Everett (the "Deputy 
Director"), that the Department regulations Dr. Rammell purportedly violated were invalid as 
they were unconstitutional and or outside the scope of the Department's statutory authority and 
unreasonable. The Hearing Officer and the Deputy Director refused to allow Dr. Rammell to 
make his arguments. In his Petition for Judicial Review, Dr. Ramrnell asserted to the district 
court that this was a denial of his due process rights under the IDAPA and Department Rules and 
also sought to have the Department regulations Dr. Rammell purportedly violated invalidated. 
The district court did not concur with the Rammells and upheld the Final Order. 
b. Course of  Proceedings Below 
The Department filed its Administrative Complaint on June 6, 2004. Dr. Rammell 
responded with an Answer and then an Amended Answer. Both parties engaged in pretrial 
discovery and entered into a Pretrial Stipulation filed on October 8, 2004. See Exhibit 6, Agency 
Record, document No. 74. This Stipulation established various facts underlying the case. See Id. 
Pursuant to this Stipulation, the Department filed an extensive Motion in Limine on November 
23, 2004, seeking to exclude evidence and witnesses that Dr. Rammell wished to present 
concerning the validity and reasonableness of the relevant Department rules. See Exhibit 6,  
Agency Record, document No. 34. Dr. Rammell also filed a Motion for Disqualification to 
disqualify the Hearing Officer for lack of sufficient expertise in the area of livestock 
management and diseases effecting cervidae. This Motion was denied. 
The matter was set for an evidentiary hearing on December 15, 16 and 30, 2004. The 
Department appeared through various representatives and its Deputy Attorney General, Brian J. 
Oakey. Respondents appeared pro se through Dr. Rammell. Before the parties submitted 
testimony and evidence, the Hearing Officer took up the matter of the Department's Motion in 
Limine. The Hearing Officer ruled as a matter of law that "I don't have authority to invalidate 
an agency rule as being unreasonable." See Exhibit 1, Hearing Transcript, p. 29, lines 2-3. The 
Hearing Officer decided she would allow Dr. Ranunell to present some evidence concerning the 
scope and reasonableness of the relevant rules to make a record for appeal, but nonetheless 
excluded or limited crucial evidence Dr. Rammell attempted to present on those issues. 
Following the close of the hearing, the parties submitted written closing briefs. The final 
closing brief was received by the Hearing Officer on February 7, 2005. The Hearing Officer 
issued her Findings of Fact, Conclusion and Preliminary Order on March 3, 2005. This 
Preliminary Order was reviewed by the Deputy Director who issued her Final Order on April 12, 
2005, affirming the Preliminary Order in all regards. The administrative proceeding was 
remanded to the Hearing Officer for an award of costs and attorney's fees for the Department, 
which in turn was affirmed by the Deputy Director. 
Mr. Rammell filed his Petition for Judicial Review of Final Order on June 10, 2005, 
raising several issues for review by the district court. The District Court entered its 
Memorandum Decision affirming the Final Order, and the Rammells appealed the Memorandum 
Decision to this Court. 
e. Statement of the Facts 
Dr. Rammell is a licensed Idaho veterinarian. He and his wife, Lynda Rammell, used to 
operate a domestic cervidae ranch doing business as Elk Country Trophy Bulls. As a result of 
this administrative matter and other events, the Rammells have since quit the domestic cervidae 
ranching business. 
When the Rammell's did operate their business, they maintained their elk at two separate 
facilities. Part of the year, the elk were at what was called the Green Canyon facility. The 
remainder of the year, the elk were returned to the Rammell's home ranch located at 1365 West 
5500 South, Rexburg, Idaho 83440. 
In December of 2003, Kelly Mortensen, an inspector with the Department of Agriculture, 
contacted Dr. Rammell to conduct an annual elk inventory of the elk located on the Rammell's 
property in Rexbug. Dr. Rammell declined the invitation to allow the Department to conduct an 
inventory because it would require the Department to "work the elk", i.e. run the elk through a 
chute for counting purposes. When this procedue was done in the past, it resulted in 
considerable damage to Dr. Rammell's elk, including the loss of a bull elk's antlers, causing the 
elk to be destroyed. See Exhibit 3, Hearing Transcript, pp. 641-642, lines 18-16. Believing that 
"working the elk" constituted a seizure of property without due process, Dr. Rammell advised 
Kelly Mortensen he wanted to go to administrative hearing as soon as possible to contest the 
infringement of Dr. Rammell's constitutional rights and the reasonableness of the Department's 
rnles in this regard. 
By letter dated December 24,2003, the Department asked Dr. Rammell to reconsider his 
position. That letter is signed by Dr. Dan Crowell, DVM, Chief, Bureau of Animal Health and 
Livestock. See Exhibit 6,  Agency Record, document 78. That letter cites the applicable rules 
and statutes and requested Dr. Rammell to cooperate by submitting his annual domestic cervidae 
inventory to the Department no later than December 31, 2003, and requesting Dr. Rammell to 
cooperate with the Department to complete its inventory. 
In response, Dr. Rammell sent a letter to Dr. Crowell dated December 31, 2003. See 
Exhibit 6, Agency Record, document No. 76. Dr. Rammell reiterated his concern that to allow 
the inventory would violate the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. Also, Dr. Rammell 
argued the sole purpose of the monitoring program was to control Chronic Wasting Disease, 
which is not a threat in Idaho, making the pervasive regulation of elk ranching unnecessary and 
unreasonable. That letter contends there should be a voluntary certification program similar to 
that used to prevent and eradicate Scrapie in sheep. He explained that he was protesting the 
rules, stating: 
. . . included in my protest in the rule which allows the State to run my elk through 
the chute for mandatory identification validation, the rule requiring a mandatory 
submission of my records, the rule requiring the mandatory submission of brains 
within 24 hours of an elk's death, and the mandatory payment of $5.00 per head 
per year (if the State is going to charge the breeders by the head each year then a 
similar fee must be placed on all other livestock). I also plan to protest the import 
rules, specifically the brain worm regulations and the unreasonableness and 
interference with our right to interstate commerce imposed by the five year CWD 
'de facto' moratorium. 
I am not protesting or challenging the State's authority to inspect my facility or 
elk on a routine annual basis for facility adequacy and general elk health. Any 
other non routine inspection through out the year will, however, require a search 
warrant showing probable cause for the search and or seizure of my animals or 
records (see OSH2 v. Barlow). Monday, December 2gth, I invited Kelly 
Mortensen and Mark Hyndman to complete an animal inspection of my facility 
and elk herd, including a head count if desired. If the Department has probable 
cause to run a particular elk through the chute, the necessary Warrant will need to 
be provided for my cooperation. 
See Exhibit 6, Agency Record, document No. 76. 
An Administrative Warrant for Entry and Inspection was signed by the Honorable Brent 
Moss on January 15,2004. An Amended Administrative Warrant for Entry and Inspection was 
issued by the Honorable Brent Moss on January 26,2004, 
On January 22, 2004, Dr. Dan Crowell called the Rammell residence and was informed 
Dr. Ramme11 was in Reno, Nevada. Mrs. Rammell agreed to allow the inspectors on the 
property. Dr. Crowell, Kelly Mortensen and Deputy Dusty Davidson, with the Madison County 
Sheriff's Office, conducted an inspection of the facility. They observed the exterior fence in the 
working alley leading to the restraint facility was cut and in need of repair. They also observed a 
gate in the south exterior fence were a snow drift had created gap between the gate and the 
adjacent post, which could possibly allow ingress and egress for small cervidae. They further 
observed one post where the fence wire was not attached to the post. A pole was down on the 
west side of the old restraint facility in the southwest comer of the bull pen. A gap in the fence 
exceeding 24 feet between posts was also noted at another point in the fence. An official head 
count was made and indicated approximately fifty bulls, eighty to eighty-five cows and twenty- 
five or thirty calves. There was one visible dangle or cattle ID tag. All the elk except the calves 
had silver USDA tags which filled the requirements of official identification and were visible but 
not readable from a distance. Dr. Crowell advised both Dr. Rammell and Mrs. Rammell the 
Department would still need to do an inventory validation process which would require working 
the animals. 
The Department obtained an extension of the Administrative Warrant and appeared at the 
Rammell residence on January 26, 2004, to continue the inventory verification. Dr. Crowell 
advised Dr. Rammell it would be impossible to complete the inventory verification without 
individually working the animals given the majority of the animals did not have identifiable tags 
on them that could be read from a distance. Dr. Rammell stated he had not placed USDA ID 
tags on the calf elk because he had planned to use tattoos. He stated that the use of tags created a 
negative impact on his hunting operation. 
The Department then proceeded to remove snow in the area of the restraint facility and 
repaired the break in the east exterior fence of the working alley. Elk boxes were constructed 
and the Department officials and Deputy Davidson left the Rammell premises. 
On January 27,2004, Dr. Crowell and Mr. Mortensen, among other Department officials, 
returned to the Rammell residence with Deputy Dusty Davidson. They gathered the calves to 
inventory them. The calves were worked through the restraint systems. Department employees 
determined the sex of the calves and recorded identification for each of the calves. One cow was 
found in the same pasture and had a dangle or cattle tag that could be read from a distance. The 
Department counted twenty-four calves and one cow that day. 
The Department employees returned January 28, 2004, to inventory the elk cows. The 
Department brought snow machines to gather the cows. When the cows were gathered, two 
additional calves were found with the cows. 
The Department officials again returned January 29, 2004, to inventory the bulls. The 
Department's inventory found the number of elk that day, including fifty-two bulls, six cows and 
two calves. 
Department officials videotaped the elk to document the condition of the elk after the 
inventory was completed. A few of the bulls were stiff and had abrasions on their sides 
I following the inventory. Dr. Rarnrnell did notify Dr. Crowell that an antler with three small 
I 
points had been knocked off one elk during the process. This antler was found by Deputy 
Davidson who observed the working of the elk and was presented to the Hearing Officer by Mr. 
R a m e l l  as an exhibit. See Exhibit 6, Agency Record, Rammell Exhibits 122 and 123. 
On January 30, 2004, Dr. Crowell arrived at the Rammell residence to do a records 
I inventory. Dr. Crowell brought a copy machine, paper and other equipment with him. When 
comparing the 2004 inventory numbers with the inventory done in 2003, the Department 
determined by their count that twenty-eight head of elk were missing. Dr. Rarnrnell disputed this 
claim and submitted evidence which was ignored by the Hearing Officer that there were no 
missing elk. See Exhibit 3, pp. 651-653, lines 7-20; Exhibit 6, Agency Record, documents No. 
66. The Department claimed that 28 elk were missing because they couldn't find the elk with tag 
numbers that matched the previous inventory. But Dr. Rammell showed them using the 
Department's own records that the head count was correct regardless of the fact that the numbers 
I were missing. See Id. Mr. Rammell asked that this charge in the original Administrative 
Complaint be dismissed as the number, 28, was wrong. The Hearing Officer declined and then 
inexplicably and unilaterally amended the number of missing elk to 23. 
By August, 2004, Dr. Rammell corrected the fencing problems and paid the $5.00 per 
head fee in order to purchase and transport further domestic cervidae to his ranch. Mr. Rammell 
fixed all of the fencing problems within a few days, but representatives of the Department never 
came back to see if the problems had fixed until August. 
Nonetheless, the Department filed its Administrative Complaint citing a violation of 
Idaho Code § 25-3708 (Five ($5) dollars per elk administrative fee) and eight (8) violations of 
Department rules regarding fencing, inventorying, and movement of elk. Specifically, the 
Department cited: 
1. Failure to remit the five (5) dollar per head administrative fee for 2004, 
pursuant to I.C. 5 25-3708; 
2. Failure of cervidae to have official identification by December 31 on calves 
pursuant to IDAPA 02.04.19.021; 
3. Failure to have a certain portion of the perimeter fence properly affrxed to the 
posts pursuant to the requirements of IDAPA 02.04.19.102.03(b); 
4. Violation of IDAPA 02.04.19.102.04 for having an excessive gap between 
fence posts; 
5. Violation of IDAPA 02.04.19.102.05 for having a gate with an excessive gap; 
6. Violation of IDAPA 02.04.19.102.06 for having a cut perimeter fence and a 
fence with a pole down, creating a gap; 
7. Violation of IDAPA 02.04.19.200 and 201 for not submitting an annual 
domestic cervidae report and violation of IDAPA 02.04.19.200 and 250 for 
having twenty-eight (28) head of domestic cervidae unaccounted for and for 
moving domestic cervidae in 2003 from one premises to another without 
submitting an Interstate Movement Certificate; 
8. Violation of LDAPA 02.04.19.202 for not gathering and restraining domestic 
cervidae for inventory verification; and 
9. Violation of IDAPA 02.04.19.250 for moving in 2004 domestic cervidae from 
one premise to another without submitting an Interstate Movement Certificate. 
After the conclusion of the administrative hearing, the Hearing Officer found Dr. 
Rammell liable on all nine (9) counts, resulting in a fine of $29,000 plus costs and attorney's 
fees. See Exhibit 6, Agency Record, document No. 66, p. 14. As stated, the Hearing Officer 
refused to consider Dr. Rammell's challenge to the constitutionality of the statute he allegedly 
violated or whether the rules where unreasonable or beyond authority of the Department to 
promulgate. See Id. at pp. 14-17. The Hearing Officer claims as a matter of law she had no 
authority to consider such challenges. Id. 
On review, the Deputy Director affirmed the Preliminary Order in all regards. See 
Agency Record, document No. 68, p. 13. The Deputy Director emphasized that all evidence 
about the reasonableness of the Department rules should have been excluded, that such a 
determination is entirely an issue of law and that a party to an administrative hearing before the 
Department can only raise such a challenge in front of the Department Director upon review of a 
preliminary order. Id at pp. 8, 10-1 1. 
Mr. Rammell filed his Petition for Judicial Review of the Final Order on June 10, 2005, 
raising several issues for review by the district court, which can be summarized as follows: 
1. Whether the Hearing Officer violated the Rammells' due process rights in 
excluding evidence of the reasonableness of the relevant Department Rules; 
2. Whether LC. 5 25-3708 was constitutional; 
3. Whether the Department rules at issue were unreasonable and beyond the 
scope of the Department's authority; 
4. Whether the hearing officer should have recused herself; and, 
5. Whether the award of attorney's fees and costs was proper. 
Before the district court, Mr. Rammell briefed and argued primarily the issue of whether 
the Hearing Officer violated the Rammells' due process rights. In its Memorandum Decision, 
the District Court held that the Hearing Officer did not violate Mr. Rammell's due process rights 
by excluding evidence of the reasonableness of the Department Rules. 
11. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the Hearing Officer violated the Rarnmells' due process rights in excluding 
evidence of the reasonableness of the relevant Department Rules; 
2. Whether I.C. 5 25-3708 is constitutional; 
3. Whether the hearing officer should have recused herself; 
4. Whether the Department rules at issue were unreasonable and beyond the scope of the 
Department's authority; and, 
5. Whether the award of attorney's fees and costs was proper. 
III. 
S T A N D D  OF REVIEW 
Where a district court acts in its appellate capacity pursuant to the Idaho Administrative 
Procedure Act (IDAPA), this Court reviews the agency record independently of the district 
court's decision. Levin v. Idaho State Bd of Medicine, 133 Idaho 413,417,987 P.2d 1028, 1032 
(1999); Lamar Corp. v. City of Twin Falls, 133 Idaho 36, 39, 981 P.2d 1146, 1149 (1999). The 
Court will defer to the agency's findings of fact unless those findings are clearly erroneous and 
unsupported by evidence in the record. Lamar Corp., 133 Idaho at 39, 981 P.2d at 1149. This 
Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on 
factual matters. I.C. 5 67-5279(1); Levin, 133 Idaho at 417,987 P.2d at 1032. 
An agency's order must be upheld by the reviewing court unless its decision (a) violates 
statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) exceeds the agency's statutory authority; (c) is made 
upon unlawFul procedure; (d) is not supported by substantial evidence in the record; or (e) is 
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. LC. Ij 67-5279(3). 
IV. 
THE HEAWING OFFICER'S EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE ON THE ISSUE OF THE 
mASBNmLENESS OF THE DEPARTNIENT'S RULES VIOLATED THE 
R4RINGELLS' DUE PROCESS RIGHTS 
In his Amended Answer to the Administrative Complaint, Dr. Rammell challenged as 
unreasonable and invalid each Department Rule he was cited for violating. See Exhibit 6, 
Agency Record, document No. 6. The basis for Dr. Rammell's challenge was that the 
Department was empowered with making rules and regulations pursuant to LC. $25-3704 for the 
sole purposes of prevention of diseases. See I.C. $ 25-3704; see also Exhibit 6, Agency Record, 
document No. 51 and Exhibit 2, Hearing Transcript, pp. 465-468, lines 24-16. Dr. Rammell 
contends that the regulations he was cited for violating had no relation to preventing diseases 
(namely Chronic Wasting Disease) and are thus unreasonable and beyond the scope of the 
Department's rule making authority. See Exhibit 6, Agency Record, document No. 51. Dr. 
Rammell also argued that there is no Chronic Wasting Disease in Idaho and that there is no 
likely threat orthe spread of the disease due to domestic cervidae operations, further malting the 
regulations unreasonahle. Id. 
As stated above, the Hearing Officer concluded she had no authority to rule whether a 
Department Administrative Rule was unreasonahle. See Agency Record, document No. 66, pp. 
16-17. The Hearing Officer provided no authority for this conclusion. Despite that fact, the 
Deputy Director upheld the Hearing Officer's legal conclusion, stating that the reasonableness of 
an administrative rule is not evidentiary, that such a challenge is an issue of law and thus not a 
matter for a hearing officer. See Exhibit 6, Agency Record, document No. 68, pp. 8, 10. The 
Deputy Director cited I.C. $ 67-5225(3) and LC. $ 67-5279(2) as authority supporting &is 
conclusion. The Deputy Director went further and declared that in the future any such challenge 
was to he made directly to the Director of the Department or his designee, despite ihe Attorney 
General's Rules of Administrative Procedure to the contrary. Id. at p. 9. 
Upon review, Mr. Rammell pointed out to the district court that LC. $ 67-5225(3) and 
I.C. § 67-5279(2) state nothing about whether a "reasonableness" challenge to an Administrative 
Rule is to be confined to merely questions of law or whether a Hearing Officer in an 
administrative hearing can take in evidence on such an issue. Dr. Rammell also asserted to the 
district court that the Idaho Attorney General's Rules of Administrative Procedure explicitly 
state that the issue of whether an Administrative Rule is within an agencies rule making power 
can be determined by a hearing officer. See IDAPA 04.1 1.01.416. I.C. fi 67-5206(5)@) states 
that the Attorney General's Rules of Administrative Procedure will control administrative 
proceedings of Idaho agencies unless an agency adopts its "own procedures ... [with] a finding 
that states the reasons why the relevant portion of the attorney general's rules were inapplicable 
to the agency under the circumstances." I.C. fi 67-5206(5)(b). A review of the Idaho 
Department of Agriculture's Administrative Rules shows that the section of those rules 
concerning the scope of authority of hearing officers is almost exactly similar as that of the 
Attorney General's, except that the Department's Rule in no way addresses the issues of 
challenges to statules or review of Administrative Rules. See IDAPA 02.01.01.010.05, compare 
IDAPA 04.1 1.01.413, 415 and 416. Given that the Department's Administrative Rules fail to 
address the crucial issues of review of statutes or rules, Mr. Rammell argued to the district court, 
the "relevant portion" of the Attorney General's rules would then apply to the Department under 
I.C. fi 67-5206(5)(b), namely IDAPA 04.11.01.416 would thus apply to the Department. Thus 
the Hearing Officer in this case should have been able to consider the issue of the reasonableness 
of the Department rules being enforced against Dr. Ramrnell. 
This district court rejected Mr. Rammell's argument and held that given IDAF'A 
04.11.01.416's use of the word "may", that rule gave agencies discretionary authority whether to 
hear challenges to rules in a contested case. See Record, 159-160. The district court concluded 
that since the Director of the Department had not delegated such authority to the Hearing Officer, 
the Hearing Officer was not obliged to hear arguments. Id The district court surmised that the 
Rammells had other channels within which to challenge the reasonableness of the Department 
rules, citing I.C. 9 67-5273(1), declaratory judgment proceedings and proposing rule changes. 
Mr. Rammell contends that the district court's ruling and the Department's ruling are in 
legal error. A fundamental right of due process is the "right to a fair opportunity to defend 
against the State's accusations," Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973), and "a 
meaningll opportunity to present a complete defense," Califovnia v. Tvombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 
485 (1984). "It goes without saying that the requirements of a fair hearing include notice of the 
claims of the opposing party and an opportunity to meet them." Fedeval Tvade Com'n v. National 
Lead Co. 352 U.S. 419, 427 (1957). See also Movtimev v. Riviera Apavtments, 122 Idaho 839, 
840 P.2d 383 (1992)("Moreover, it would be manifestly unfair and likely in derogation of 
procedural due process to determine an issue with potentially significant financial consequences 
against a party who was not given notice or an opportunity to defend.) 
'The state, via the Department, has accused the Rammells of violation of several 
Department rules and an Idaho Statute. The Rammells' main defense was that the rules were 
unreasonable. He was denied the ability to raise this defense in the very proceeding where such 
a defense was relevant. The Department should have no discretion whether or not to hear 
evidence on the reasonableness of administrative rules. The four-prong test set forth by this 
Court in J.R. Simplot Co. v. Tux Com'n, 120 Idaho 849, 820 P.2d 1206 (1991), clearly 
contemplates both issues of law and fact and involved in determining whether a rule is 
reasonable or not. It is not disputed by the State that the Hearing Officer excluded the main 
element of evidence that Mr. Rammell wished to present to challenge the reasonableness of the 
Department rules, namely the testimony of Dr. Clarence Siroky.1 Mr. Rammell asks that the 
I At the administrative hearing, Dr. Rammell called Dr. Clarence Siroky, the then Administrator of the 
Department of Animal Industries and State Veterinarian. See Exhibit 2 at pp. 448-488, lines 18-10. His testimony 
Court hold that an Idaho agency must hear evidence related to the reasonable of a rule if such a 
defense is raised. Mr. Rammell also asks that IDAPA 04.11.01.416 be found to have been 
unconstitutional as applied to Mr. Rammell as in violation of his due process rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment and by incorporation the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 
v. 
I.C. 8 25-3708 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
The Rammells assert that I.C. 25-3708 is unconstitutional. This statute allows 
collection of an annual "fee" per head of domestic cervidae to be remitted to the Department for 
purposes related to cervidae management. 
First, this statute violated the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. 
"It is generally presumed that legislative acts are constitutional, that the state legislature has 
acted within its constitutional powers, and any doubt concerning interpretation of a statute is to 
be resolved in favor of that which will render the statute constitutional." Olsen v. LA. Freeman 
Co., 117 Idaho 706, 709,791 P.2d 1285, 1288 (1990). "Under either the Fourteenth Amendment 
was excluded on the grounds of relevance and foundation. The relevance objection was merely that there was no 
allegation in the Administrative Complaint concerning disease. That ohjection was sustained. See Id. at p. 462, ls7- 
20; p. 464, lines 9-14; and p. 465, limes 12-21. 
Dr. R m e l l  made an offer of proof, stating that Dr. Siroky's testimony would, as the enforcer and 
promulgator of the Department Rules, show that the Department's Rules at issue have no or minute preventative 
effect with regard to the dissemination of disease among elk and that there is little or no risk of Chronic Wasting 
Disease in Idaho. See Id., pp. 465-466, lines 24-24. Clearly, such testimony is relevant, necessary and crucial to Dr. 
Rammell's contention that the rules at issue are invalid. 
The Foundation ohjection was made when he was asked about the reasonableness on the ground that Dr. 
Siroky was not with the Department at the time the Rules were promulgated. See Id. at pp. 474-479, lines 2-25. Dr. 
Siroky was charged with implementation and enforcement of Department Rules then in existence, which included 
the Rules at issue. He clearly has knowledge at to whether the Rules are in any way effective in preventing disease 
and thus have any nexus to the purposes of the statute under which they were created. 
The exclusion of this crucial and necessary testimony prejudiced Dr. Rammell's argument in this regard 
and prevented him from mounting a defense - a violation of I.C. 5 67-5279(3)(a)(c) and (e). 
or the Idaho Constitution, a classification will survive rational basis analysis if the classification 
is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose." Meisner v. Potlatch Corp., 13 1 Idaho 
258, 262, 954 P.2d 676, 680 (1998). "Under the 'rational basis test,' a classification will 
withstand an equal protection challenge if there is any conceivable state of facts which will 
support it." Bint v. Creative Forest Prods., 108 Idaho 116, 120,697 P.2d 818, 822 (1985). 
Under I.C. 3 25-3701, cervidae ranching and domestic cervidae are considered an 
agricultural pursuit and livestock respectively. No other subsection of livestock or the ranching 
thereof mentioned in the Idaho Code is subject to any special fee similar to this. I.C. § 25-3708 
economically discriminates against cervidae ranchers. No rational basis is set forth in the 
statutory scheme justifying this unique fee, and no basis can be offered other than the fact that 
cervidae ranching is disfavored by the Department. 
In the alternative, I.C. 5 25-3708 is unconstitutional under Article 111, Section 19 of the 
Idaho Constitution, which states in pertinent part that the "Legislature shall not pass local or 
special laws in any of the following enumerated cases, that is to say: . . . . For the assessment and 
collection of taxes." The "fee" collected under LC. 5 25-3708 is, under Kootenai County 
Property Ass'n v. Kootenai County, 115 Idaho 676,769 P.2d 553 (1989), a tax. In Kootenai, this 
Corn held that an annual solid waste disposal fee was not a tax because that fee was "reasonably 
related to the services rendered by the county in acquiring, establishing, maintaining and 
operating its solid waste disposal system." Id. at 680,769 P.2d at 557. Here, the "fee" under I.C. 
5 25-3708 does not go toward providing any service. The "fee" goes to funding the government 
regulation of cervidae. It is the epitome of a tax, and it is unconstitutional because it is levied 
discriminatorily only on one type of livestock and not on all types of livestock despite the fact 
that the Idaho Code treats all livestock similarly. See Title 25, Chapters 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 of the 
Idaho Code; see also I.C. 5 25-3701. To date no other livestock industry pays such a fee; only 
cervidae ranching is subject to this fee. 
VI. 
THE H E M M G  OFFICER SHOULD WAVE DISQUALIFIED NEWELF 
Dr. Rammell made a pre-hearing Motion to Disqualify the Hearing Officer pursuant to 
I.C. 5 67-5252. See Exhibit 6, Agency Record, document No. 49. I.C. $ 67-5252 states that a 
party can disqualify a presiding officer for bias and lack of expert knowledge. See I.C. 5 67- 
5252. The Motion was based upon the fact that Dr. Ramme11 wished to contest the 
reasonableness of the applicable rules which would require that the Hearing Officer have some 
knowledge of the industry so as to better be able to make rulings and determinations on the 
record with regard to objections and the issue of reasonableness. See Id The Hearing Officer 
did not deny she lacked expert knowledge of the cervidae industry, however, she denied this 
Motion. See Exhibit 6, Agency Record, document No. 65; Exhibit 2, pp. 488-490, lines 17-16. 
If reasonableness of the Rules were an issue before the Hearing Officer, which as argued above it 
properly should have been, then the Hearing Officer should have recused herself for lack of 
expertise in the field of cervidae. Not to do so was an error. 
THE IPEIPARTmNT RULES EWQBRCED AGAINST 
THE RAMMELLS ARE UNmASONPaIPLE 
The Rammells assert that the Department rules they were cited for violating are 
unreasonable. 
Under J.R. Simplot Co. v. Tax Com'n, 120 Idaho 849, 820 P.2d 1206 (1991), an agency 
rule is invalid, among many reasons, if it does not have a reasonable relationship to the statute. 
Id. at 862, 820 P.2d at 1219. The statute in question is LC. 3 25-3704, which states: 
The administrator of the division of animal industries is hereby authorized 
and empowered to make, promulgate, and enforce general and reasonable 
rules not inconsistent with law, for the prevention of  the introduction or 
dissemination of  diseases among domestic cervidae of this state, and to 
otherwise effectuate enforcement of the provisions of chapters 2, 3, 4, 6 
and 37, title 25, Idaho Code, applicable to domestic cervidae. 
(emphasis added). Under this statute, Department rules must relate to disease introduction or 
prevention. 
The first rule the Rammells were cited for violating, TDAPA 02.04.19.021, demands that 
cervidae have official identification. IDAPA 02.04.19.102.03(b) requires the perimeter fence be 
properly affixed to the posts according to exacting specifications, i.e. not more than 12 inches 
apart. IDAPA 02.04.19.102.04 requires that fence posts be of certain, exacting specifications, 
including that they be no more than twenty-four (24) feet apart. These rules have no relation to 
prevention of disease. Clearly any number of type of fences with differing specification could 
sufficiently contain domestic cervidae and ward off encounters with wild cervidae. The 
Department has set up an arbitrary set of specification where none is necessarily needed. This is 
not reasonably necessary to prevent disease. A wild cervidae would merely have to place its 
nose between or over any fence and make contact with a domestic cervidae and thus transmit 
disease. This of course is a subjective analysis that should be made by the inspectors depending 
on the lay of the land and other factors. To set arbitrary numbers on specifications is neither 
general nor reasonable. The State recognizes this [act by providing in the fencing section 
exceptions to their own rules as determined by the Department. IDAPA 02.04.19.102.03(b) and 
IDAPA 02.04.19.102.04. 
IDAPA 02.04.19.102.05 requires gates that "prevent escape of domestic cervidae or 
ingress of wild cervidae," and IDAPA 02.04.19.102.06 demands that fences be maintained to 
prevent escape of domestic cervidae or entry of wild cervidae. These are not reasonable because 
they are excessively vague and not related to the purpose of preventing disease for the same 
reason cited above, i.e. that wild cervidae can make contact with domestic cervidae through gates 
and fences of any type unless the fence hermetically seals the domestic cervidae, which no 
fences containing domestic livestock do. The main purpose behind the aforementioned 
regulations is to facilitate mere regulatory control on the part of the Department over elk 
ranchers aid not disease prevention. 
IDAPA 02.04.19.202 requires cervidae owners to gather and restrain domestic cervidae 
for inventory verification, IDAPA 02.04.19.200 requires submission of annual domestic cervidae 
reports, and IDAPA 02.04.19.250 requires certificates for interstate movement of domestic 
cervidae. Again these rules have no relationship to prevention of disease. They are geared 
toward management and control of domestic ranch operations. If the rules tied in specifically 
with testing of cervidae for disease then perhaps there would be a reasonable link. But there is 
none. The true motive behind these rules is, Dr. Ramme11 surmises, to closely regulate an 
industry competitive with State licensing for wild cervidae hunting and to prevent poaching of 
wild elk. 
mP1. 
THE AWARD OF ATT0)lQRTEY'S PEES SEilOUED BE 'VACATED 
Attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $29,372.96 were awarded to the Department 
under I.C. 3 12-117(1) on the grounds that Dr. Rammell's contest to the Administrative 
Complaint was without basis in law or fact. See Exhibit 6, Agency Record, document No. 69 
and 70. The district court halved this award for attorney's fees on the ground that the Hearing 
Officer bore some responsibility for the creation of an unnecessary and lengthy record in this 
case. See Record, p. 161. 
If on appeal, the Find Order andlor the memorandum decision is reversed, then clearly he 
had a basis in law and in fact to justify his contest and the award of attorney's fees should be 
reversed. 
If Dr. Rammell does not prevail on any of his issues he has appealed, he is still entitled to 
a reversal of the award of attorney's fees. Count 7 of the Administrative Complaint contends 
that Dr. Rammell lost twenty-eight (28) elk in violation of IDAPA 02.04.19.200 and 250. 
During the hearing Dr. Rammell challenged this unstipulated factual contention, which resulted 
in the Hearing Officer finding that in fact only twenty-three (23) elk were unaccounted for. See 
Exhibit 3, pp. 651-653, lines 7-20; Exhibit 6, Agency Record, documents No. 66. Dr. Rammell's 
case was not without a factual basis. The facts show that he did not fail to account for twenty- 
eight (28) elk and that the Department was incorrect on that point. Thus Dr. Rammell's contest 




It is a fact of the regulatory universe that once promulgated, an Administrative Rule will 
not come under judicial scrutiny until challenged. When an individual is brought into an 
administrative hearing on an Administrative Complaint, it is entirely logical that the defendant 
should be able, as a defense, to challenge the validity of the rule for which he is accused of 
violating. This is directly supported by the IDAPA and the Administrative Rules of the Attorney 
General, which apply in relevant part to the Department. Dr. Rammell sought to challenge the 
rules at issue, but was prevented from obtaining a competent Hearing Officer and prevented from 
introducing relevant and crucial evidence in his defense. Dr. Rammell asks that the 
administrative case before him be dismissed without further action. See Bonnev Gen. Hosp. v. 
Bonner County, 133 Idaho 7,981 P.2d. 242 (1999). In the alternative, Dr. Ramme11 asks that the 
case be remanded so that he may mount a challenge to the validity of the relevant rules as should 
have been done in the first hearing. 
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